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To test whether naturally occurring markets can be strategically
manipulated, $500 and $1,000 bets were made, then canceled, at
horse racing tracks. The net effects of these costless temporary bets
give clues about how market participants react to information large
bets might contain. The bets moved odds on horses visibly (com-
pared to matched-pair control horses with similar prebet odds) and
had a slight tendency to draw money toward the horse that was
temporarily bet, but the net effect was close to zero and statistically
insignificant. The results suggest that some bettors inferred infor-
mation from bets and others did not, and their reactions roughly
canceled out.
I. Introduction
This paper reports an unusual field experiment that attempts to ma-
nipulate prices in a naturally occurring asset market: pari-mutuel
betting on thoroughbred racing. The experiment addresses two
questions: First, can markets be manipulated? Second, what does the
effect of attempted manipulation tell us about the way prices in cen-
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tralized asset markets reflect the aggregated information held by
traders?
These questions have fascinated economists and other social ob-
servers for a long time. The answers are of practical importance be-
cause much of the case for the social value of organized asset mar-
kets—particularly for derivative assets such as options, stock indexes,
and so forth—rests on the presumption that markets cannot be eas-
ily manipulated (so small investors are not routinely bilked by large
ones). While most economists probably do not believe that market
manipulation is widespread, many small investors do. The ability, or
inability, to manipulate a naturally occurring market in a controlled
experiment provides rare evidence of the feasibility of manipulation.
A further claim is that information about important financial data
is better conveyed if these derivative markets exist than if they do
not, because prices aggregate information. It follows that if these
markets do not aggregate information well, perhaps they should not
exist. The ability to manipulate the market provides indirect evi-
dence about information aggregation.
A. Information Aggregation
There is much more theory about aggregation of information than
there is careful observation. The standard theoretical claim is that
information could not be perfectly aggregated and revealed by
prices because, if it was, no traders could profit from collecting infor-
mation (the ‘‘Grossman-Stiglitz paradox’’). A corollary principle fol-
lows logically: If prices are a noisy reflection of what people collec-
tively think assets are worth (e.g., because of exogenous shocks in
the supply of shares or trading for liquidity), then the benefit to
collecting information is restored, traders will pay to dig up informa-
tion, and prices again have something to aggregate (but can do so
only imperfectly).
Meanwhile, a decade or two of very careful, persistent experimen-
tal observation has proceeded in a one-sided dialogue with theory
(see Duxbury [1995] and Sunder [1995] for reviews). In a typical
experiment (e.g., Plott and Sunder 1982), traders are given free in-
formation about asset values. Usually traders have different informa-
tion, which is collectively perfect about the underlying asset value.
When asset values take on two or three different values and assets
live just one period, information aggregates nicely so that the price
that results from trading based on private information is close to the
price that would result if everyone revealed his or her own informa-
tion to others honestly. When information structures are more com-
plicated, information aggregates less smoothly (see Sunder 1995).
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Thus the cumulation of 20 years of theorizing and a similar span
of experimental observation is that nearly perfect aggregation is a
theoretical possibility that is commonly observed in simple experi-
mental environments but rarely observed in complex ones.
Another strand of related literature is studies of stock market reac-
tions to large-block trades. Scholes (1972) established, contrary to
the conventional wisdom of the time, that prices drop slightly when
large blocks (‘‘secondary distributions’’) are traded because the
market thinks that the sale reveals bad news (not because of tempo-
rary price pressure). Dann, Mayers, and Raab (1977) showed that
the adjustment of prices to the perceived bad news happens quickly,
in minutes. Since the temporary bets we make are similar to large-
block trades, it is conceivable the betting market would think that
they reveal information. If the Dann et al. finding applies, prices
would quickly and permanently adjust.
B. Market Manipulation
For present purposes, define market manipulation to mean trading
against one’s information or preferences, to create price movements
that will lure other investors and ultimately allow later profit. In al-
leged manipulations of this sort, a firm’s managers ‘‘prop’’ up its
stock price by aggressive buying and then later sell as investors take
the bait and prices rise.
Markets in which some investors try to infer information of others
from price signals might be vulnerable to market manipulation of
this sort. Manipulators could make uninformative trades that might
seem to convey information, but are actually made to deliberately
mislead uninformed traders (for the purpose of later profit). There
is a modest theoretical literature on this possibility but few data (e.g.,
Allen and Gale 1992; Benabou and Laroque 1992).
The experimental literature provides both an illustration of how
manipulation might work and a little evidence of the vulnerability
of markets. Camerer and Weigelt (1991) and Sunder (1992) con-
ducted markets for one-period assets of uncertain value. The num-
ber of traders who were (perfectly) informed about the asset’s value
in each period varied (it was sometimes zero), and that number was
not common knowledge. Thus there were periods in which no trad-
ers were informed, but no trader knew that (and given their priors,
traders thought it was likely that somebody else was informed). In
some of these periods in which no traders were informed, subjects
sometimes overreacted to trades that were similar to previously infor-
mative trades. For example, in one period of trading, subjects had
seen the price rise swiftly, and it was later revealed that the asset
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value was high. Then in the next period, a small upward price move-
ment led traders to believe that the asset value was high. These reac-
tions became self-fulfilling, as traders watching the market became
increasingly convinced that some other traders must be informed.
The result was ‘‘mirages’’ or falsely revealing informational price
bubbles (e.g., Camerer and Weigelt 1991; Sunder 1992). These mi-
rages are a theoretical possibility that can be observed clearly in the
lab. However, mirages were rare. And in later trading periods of the
experiment, after subjects had more experience, there were only
temporary mirages—brief strings of self-fulfilling price changes that
would self-correct after a minute or so and reverse direction.
In these experiments, there is no evidence that traders were deliber-
ately creating mirages. But since mirages did occur and traders mis-
takenly became convinced during the mirage episodes that others
had information (which was revealed by the prices), the possibility
exists that traders eager to infer information from price signals could
be fooled by extremely clever traders. For example, Bill Gates could
rush onto the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and sell Micro-
soft shares hysterically—causing astute traders to think that Bill
knew bad news, and sell—while his minions buy up shares at de-
pressed prices. On the other hand, rational traders who are aware of
the possibility of manipulation might not be fooled by such a display.
While this kind of informational market manipulation is sometimes
mentioned anecdotally,1 it is rarely clearly observed in the wild;
hence, any such effects are hard to pin down and evaluate statisti-
cally. An experiment that attempts such manipulation under con-
trolled conditions is therefore useful.
An additional goal of this experiment is methodological. Field
tests of information aggregation with naturally occurring data are
extremely rare because the information held by traders is rarely ob-
served. Since field tests are rare and many experiments have been
run that test theory directly, it is surprising that careful observation
from controlled laboratory experiments has not influenced theoriz-
1 There is a well-known story about Nathan Rothschild, who was famous for having
the fastest carrier pigeons in London, trading flamboyantly in the (ex post) wrong
direction after receiving news about Napoleon in Waterloo, while his agents covertly
bought up shares made cheap by Rothschild’s ruse. Temporary bets of the sort re-
ported in this paper are apparently common in New Zealand: ‘‘It is no secret that
pro punters have been artificially suppressing the dividends [odds] of horses they
want to back down to levels where the average punter will not invest’’ (‘‘New Rules
Hit Pro Punters,’’ 1997, p. 43). Having displaced money from a favored horse, which
‘‘New Zealand punters, unlike Australians, traditionally shy away from,’’ the pros
then withdraw most of their bet and allegedly get inflated odds. In an effort to
prevent such manipulations, in 1997 betting houses withdrew the right to cancel
bets of more than $200 less than 15 minutes before race time.
asset market manipulation 461
ing more. One reason for this lack of influence may be that labora-
tory markets do not have all the features of naturally occurring mar-
kets, which makes one cautious in generalizing from the lab. (Of
course, features can be added to experiments, if theory predicts that
they will matter.) This paper simply circumvents the concern about
generalizability by providing evidence from a true, controlled exper-
iment in a naturally occurring market.
C. How This Research Came About
This research was inspired by two lucky observations.
First, occasional attempts at market manipulation were observed
in pari-mutuel betting experiments conducted at Caltech by Plott,
Wit, and Yang (1996) (and earlier by No¨th and Weber [1996]). In
the Caltech experiments, subjects are given private information
about which subset of events contains the true event. Different par-
ticipants have different information (different subsets), and the true
event is always contained in the intersection of the subsets (some-
times uniquely). For example, suppose that the events are labeled
A–F and the true event is C. Then some subjects are told that the
true event is either B or C and others are told that it is either C, D,
or E.
In these pari-mutuel markets, like the racetrack markets, subjects
place bets on which event is the true one, during a brief time period
with a stochastic end. After the single true event is revealed, those
who bet on the true event share all the money bet (plus a bonus,
to motivate subjects to trade). On a couple of occasions, participants
deliberately bet small amounts of money on events they knew could
not have happened. For example, a person who knew that the event
was either B or C might bet on D, hoping to draw money toward D,
which they could collect later by betting on B and C. While there is
anecdotal evidence of this sort of manipulation in financial markets,
its occurrence in the laboratory raised afresh the question of
whether such manipulation is possible in naturally occurring mar-
kets (and, particularly, in markets much larger than the laboratory
ones).
Second, while using a computerized system at a large horse racing
track, I mistakenly canceled a ‘‘live’’ bet on a race not yet run. This
mistake revealed the fact—which is not widely publicized—that
computerized bets on a race could be made, and then canceled,
before the race was actually run.
Putting these observations together, I realized that the attempts
at market manipulation made by subjects in the lab at Caltech could
be made in the large betting market at the racetrack, because the
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bets could be canceled. Furthermore, the betting could be done in
the form of a controlled experiment, with randomized assignments
of the betting ‘‘treatment’’ to some horses and a proper ‘‘control
group’’ of horses that were not treated experimentally.
So this paper asks the question, Does the potential information
in large bets that are made and canceled systematically mislead trad-
ers—as the participants in the Plott et al. experiments tried to do—
or does the information aggregation process ignore my temporary
bet, much as waves breaking rhythmically on a beach ignore rain
from a brief summer thunderstorm?
II. Research Design
A. Facts about Pari-mutuel Betting
Before explaining the experimental design, I need to explain some
basic facts about pari-mutuel racetrack betting. Throughout I shall
talk about only ‘‘win’’ betting: bettors collect money only if their
horse wins the race and lose their bet otherwise. Pari-mutuel betting
means that bettors put money on a horse, and if their horse wins
they get to keep their bet and also share with the other winners all
the money placed on losing horses (minus a fraction the track takes
out). Thus bettors are essentially betting against one another rather
than against a bookie who has designated odds.
In pari-mutuel betting, bettors may place bets at any time until
the race occurs. Suppose that the totals bet on horse i at the time
of the race are denoted Bi and their sum is B. The track takes a
percentage of the total bet, a cut that is predesignated and regulated
by the state, usually 15–20 percent of the amount bet (for win bets).
Then the remaining money is distributed to the winners in propor-
tion to the total bet on the winning horse. For example, if horse 7
wins, those who bet on that horse each get back (.85)B/B 7 for each
dollar they bet.2 The ‘‘win odds,’’ the fraction or multiple of earn-
ings for each dollar bet, net of getting one’s bet money back, would
be (.85B 2 B 7)/B 7 if the track takeout is 15 percent. For example,
if 25 percent of the win pool is bet on Sandpit, the win odds would
be (.85 2 .25)/.25 or 2.4–1. A bettor who placed $10 on Sandpit
and won would get $24 from the other bettors and win her $10 back.
Notice that the more is bet on a horse, the lower the odds are. The
only odds that matter for payoffs are the final odds established by
2 On a very heavy favorite, .85T could be less than T7, so that bettors get less back
than they bet if the formula is applied strictly. In these situations (which rarely occur)
the track is obliged to pay a minimum, usually $2.10 on a $2 bet, and the track loses
money.
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Fig. 1.—Cumulative betting on all horses (mean across all sample 1 races)
the cumulative total amounts that have been bet at the time the race
actually starts.
An important feature of this system is that, in contrast to betting
with bookies at odds the bookies fix and guarantee, bettors who bet
well before post time do not know the precise totals that will be bet
on different horses by the time the race begins. Hence, they do not
know the odds they will receive if their horse wins. Because of this
uncertainty, it is hard to imagine why rational bettors would bet
early, since they do not know the ‘‘price’’ they will be getting. In-
deed, while many people bet early, the cumulative total of bets does
rise sharply as post time draws near. Figure 1 shows a time series of
the mean amount of (cumulative) money bet across the races in our
first sample; the abscissa is minutes before post time. Notice that
about half the money is bet in the last 3 minutes before post time.
The fact that this graph looks a lot like the equivalent time series
of cumulative betting in the Plott et al. (1996) pari-mutuel experi-
ments is a good example of parallel behavior in laboratory and natu-
ral markets.
In the racetracks at which I experimented, the totals of cumu-
lated money bet are displayed on two large ‘‘tote boards’’ in the
middle of the racetrack ‘‘infield’’ and also on computer screens
throughout the track. Totals are refreshed every minute. This fact
is important because it enables one to unobtrusively record a
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minute-by-minute time series of how betting totals are influenced
by one’s temporary bet. It also means that bettors have ample oppor-
tunity to notice the effect of the bet almost immediately.
B. Experimental Design
The basic design is a simple ‘‘matched-pair’’ design. Each experi-
mental ‘‘subject’’—a horse that is bet temporarily, in this case—
is matched with a comparable subject, a horse in the same race. The
matched-pair design is powerful if the matches are close and control
for common sources of variation that might otherwise obscure a
treatment effect and are not easily randomized away.3
In each bet race I chose a matched pair of horses with similar
features. The key features are the forecasted ‘‘morning line’’ odds
and the initial odds set by early betting. A coin was flipped to deter-
mine which horse to temporarily bet on; the other, unbet horse be-
came a within-race control. The time at which a race is scheduled
to begin is called ‘‘post time’’ (usually the race actually starts 1–4
minutes later, and bets are taken after post time, up to the very mo-
ment the starting gate opens and the race begins). The temporary
bets usually were made 17–22 minutes before post time (after about
3 minutes of betting had taken place), and the bet cancellation came
5–8 minutes before post time. The bets took about 30 seconds to
make and cancel, so the effects of bets and cancellations sometimes
appear on the tote board in 1–2-minute intervals around the official
bet/cancel times I recorded. In the first sample, bets were $500,
which, as we shall see, is enough to move the odds on the attack
horses noticeably. (If the effect of these bets proves too small, the
bet size can be adjusted upward in further experiments, as in a sec-
ond sample reported below.)
C. Criteria for Experimental Treatment
Data were collected from three tracks in spring 1996. Races were
chosen for experimental bets if they had all of the following features.
3 The matched-pair design is useful when observing control subjects is expensive
or treatments are naturally scarce (as in some medical experiments with rare symp-
toms). Then randomized allocation of subjects to a control condition does not pro-
vide large enough samples to guarantee that uncontrolled differences between treat-
ment and control subjects ‘‘cancel out,’’ in the sense of the law of large numbers.
Matching control and treatment subjects on as many potentially relevant variables as
possible is then a better way to statistically detect the treatment effect. The ultimate
example is a ‘‘twin study,’’ widely used to compare genetic and environmental varia-
tions, in which identical twins raised apart, e.g., constitute a pair matched for genetic
factors.
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a) Two horses in the race have exactly the same ‘‘morning line
odds,’’4 from 8–1 to 50–1. I chose these relative long shots so that
a $500 bet could move their odds dramatically. In 15 cases, three
horses were used (and in two cases four were used), with one serving
as the temporary-bet horse and an average of the other two or three
serving as a composite control horse. These composite controls
smooth out variation in the control and improve test power.
b) Within 1–4 minutes of the initial display of betting totals and
before the temporary bet occurs, the two horses must have initial
betting totals within 25 percent of one another (the minimum of
the two percentage discrepancies was used). In many cases the morn-
ing line odds were the same, but this condition was not satisfied
because horses with similar morning line odds often opened with
very different amounts of money bet on them (and, hence, different
opening odds).
c) A temporary bet must be comfortably made around the window
19–23 minutes before post time for ‘‘live races’’ (where bets were
made at the track at which the race was physically run) or 17–20
minutes before post time for ‘‘remote races’’ (where bets were made
at one track on races televised at the track but run elsewhere).
In the course of several months, gathering data carefully ac-
cording to criteria a–c, I made a total of 50 temporary bets and re-
corded the minute-by-minute bet totals.
III. Theory
Before I turn to the results, it is worth working through some infor-
mal theoretical arguments about the conditions under which these
markets might react to my attempted manipulation, and in which
directions. It is important to point out at the start that some bettors
may earn their living by wagering, but the (dollar-weighted) average
bettor loses because the track’s takeout ensures that betting has a
negative expected value. Thus it is not clear why expected utility
maximizers would bet at the races. They might be risk-preferring in
the classical sense (their utility function for money is convex),
though I do not think that this is the full explanation.5 They almost
4 The morning line odds are a forecast by a handicapper employed by the track
of what the post time odds are likely to be. Matching on morning line odds matches
horses for any unobserved ability or characteristics ( jockey or post position) thought
by the track handicapper to influence the eventual odds.
5 For example, an expected-utility-maximizing person betting a horse to win, and
believing that the odds are fair, must have convex utility. But occasionally two horses
finish the race almost exactly tied, and it takes several minutes for the track stewards
to examine a photograph and declare a winner. Sometimes they cannot decide and
declare a ‘‘dead heat’’: people who bet on either horse share the money bet by all
others. These dead-heat payoffs are obviously lower than if any single horse had
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certainly think that they are relatively skilled, compared to others,
at picking winners. Or they may simply get enhanced consumption
value from watching a race they have bet on. It is also mysterious
why any bettors would bet early (keep in mind that most do not).
Since the money one can win is determined by the cumulative total
bet at the time the race begins, the odds are never certain and fluc-
tuate a bit before the race; so betting early just adds an element of
price risk that bettors presumably dislike.
Since we do not have a clear understanding of why bettors bet at
all, and bet early, it seems inappropriate, or at least too difficult, to
create a full-blown theory. Instead, I suppose that bettors come to
the track with a preference to bet, some prior opinions about each
horse’s chance of winning, and some preference for the timing of
bets (i.e., some people prefer to bet early and others prefer to wait).
Assume that bettors watch the tote board and may use information
about bet totals to determine their bets (in ways I spell out below).
Then manipulation should have an effect if four conditions hold:
(1) Ignorance of cancellation: Bettors must not realize that bets can be
canceled at all, or if they know that this is possible, they must think
that most bets will not be canceled. (2) Visibility: The bet must affect
the odds visibly. (3) Reaction: Traders must react to changes in per-
ceived odds. This is the crucial step in the argument; let me return
to it in a moment. (4) Asymmetry: There must be an asymmetry be-
tween their reaction to the odds when the bet is placed and their
reaction when the bet is canceled.
If the ignorance condition 1 does not hold, bettors will ignore all
bet totals until the race is so close that cancellation is not possible.
Then our temporary bets would have no effect because, by defini-
tion, we cancel them a few minutes before the race. This ignorance
condition is likely to hold because canceling is not mentioned in
any program information distributed to bettors by the track (and,
in fact, is not allowed at most racetracks in the United States). Can-
cellation also seems to be rare because the bet totals hardly ever
fall over time; if bettors were routinely canceling, the totals would
sometimes fall. Furthermore, I asked a few bettors whether bets
won (since the win pool is being shared by two sets of winners rather than just
one). If bettors have convex utility, then in the tense minutes while they wait for
the stewards’ decision they should prefer to flip a coin and either win alone or lose
than to tie and have a dead heat declared. In my experience bettors always prefer a
dead heat. Thus it seems that they ‘‘become risk-averse’’ after the race is over but
before a winner is apparent. This strongly suggests that their wagering is not due
to convex utility and risk preference, per se. Instead, it is more plausible that they
are overconfident about their relative skill at picking winners, but not at their relative
skill in guessing the outcome of a dead heat after the race is over.
asset market manipulation 467
could be canceled, and most were quite surprised that cancellation
is possible.
If the visibility condition 2 does not hold, the bet simply does not
catch their attention. The visibility condition probably does hold be-
cause, as the figures below show, the change in odds is fairly dramatic
and any bettors who glance at the tote board odds continuously be-
fore the race are likely to notice.
If the asymmetry condition 4 does not hold—bettors’ reactions
are symmetric—then there will be no net effect of the manipulation.
For example, a temporary bet might draw other people to bet on
the temporary-bet horse when the bet is first made and to bet on
other horses when the bet is canceled, and the two effects cancel
out. While this would mean that there is no net effect, the two sepa-
rate effects would be visible in the data since we have a minute-by-
minute time series of bet totals. The asymmetry condition is likely
to hold because a fixed-size bet has a much larger effect on the odds
when it is first placed than when it is canceled (as will be seen below),
because the win pool is constantly growing over time. Thus, if bettors
react to the absolute size of a change in odds, their reaction will be
stronger when the bet is made than when it is canceled. In the later
argument I assume this form of asymmetry.
The reaction condition 3 is the crucial one. To understand reac-
tions it is helpful to distinguish three possible types of bettors: opin-
ion bettors, partial rational expectations bettors, and full rational
expectations bettors.
i) Opinion bettors have an opinion (or subjective probability) about
the chances of each horse and do not infer superior information
from odds. (Opinion bettors are sometimes called ‘‘private-informa-
tion’’ investors in theorizing and experimental work.) They compare
the available odds with their opinions and choose the most favorable
odds relative to their subjective beliefs. When the temporary bet
drives the odds down, money that would flow to that horse from
opinion bettors is displaced (the bet has lowered the return they
can get without changing their opinion of the probability of win-
ning). When the temporary bet is canceled, money from the opinion
bettors comes back because the odds are now higher. For example,
suppose that my bet lowers a horse’s odds from 20–1 to 12–1. Some
opinion bettors would have bet that horse at 20–1, but they notice
the drop (if there is visibility) and are unaware that the money will
be canceled (if there is ignorance), and they therefore bet on some
other horse. Assume for the sake of argument that the odds stay at
12–1. Then when the bet is canceled several minutes later, the win
pool is larger, so the cancellation has a proportionally smaller effect
and raises the odds to, for example, 14–1. Now some bettors who
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are waiting to bet and would not bet the horse at 12–1, but will bet
at 14–1, will bet on this horse. Asymmetry assumes that the initial-
bet effect is stronger than the effect after cancellation. Assuming
visibility, ignorance, asymmetry, and reaction by opinion bettors
therefore implies that the temporary bet will displace more money
than the cancellation will draw, so the difference in the bet totals
between the temporary-bet horse and the matched control horse at
post time will be negative.
ii) Partial rational expectations bettors believe that bet totals contain
information and also believe that others do not fully adjust to the
information. (For example, they could believe that many others are
opinion bettors.) There is much evidence that at least some bettors
do react to price signals in this way. For example, the Daily Racing
Form, which contains detailed information on past performances of
horses and advice for bettors, often says ‘‘watch the tote board’’ for
fluctuations in odds of horses that have not raced before, not raced
recently, or raced at a distant track. Presumably people pay for this
advice, and sometimes follow it, because they think that everybody
else does not always do so.
If there is visibility and ignorance, when a partial rational expecta-
tions bettor sees the odds change from 20–1 to 12–1 in our example,
she will be eager to bet on the temporary-bet horse because the fall
in odds reveals information she thinks the opinion bettors will ig-
nore. The partial rational expectations bettor thinks that she can
profit by betting against them (namely, betting on the temporary-
bet horse). Similarly, when the cancellation occurs and odds rise to
14–1, partial rational expectations bettors will shun the temporary-
bet horse. If there is asymmetry, the money drawn to the temporary-
bet horse when the bet is made will be larger than the money dis-
placed when the cancellation raises the odds. Assuming visibility,
ignorance, asymmetry, and reaction by partial rational expectations
bettors therefore implies that the temporary bet will draw more
money than the cancellation will displace, so the difference in the
bet totals between the temporary-bet horse and the matched control
horse at post time will be positive.
iii) Full rational expectations bettors believe that the bet totals contain
information but that bet totals at any moment in time fully reflect
available information. Unlike the partial rational expectations bet-
tors, who think that they can jump on the bandwagon of a drop in
odds and take advantage of ignorant opinion bettors, the full ratio-
nal expectations bettors think that the odds are always good fore-
casts. Assume that they therefore bet their money in the same pro-
portion as the proportions already in the bet pool. As a result, when
the temporary bet is made, the amount of money full rational expec-
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tations bettors bet on the temporary-bet horse will increase. Indeed,
by definition, full rational expectations bettors will keep the odds
steady (because they bet in proportions that are the same as those
in the pool at the time they bet). In our example, after the temporary
bet is made, when the odds are lowered to 12–1, full rational expec-
tations bettors will bet so as to keep the odds at 12–1. When the bet
is canceled and the odds hop up to 14–1, full rational expectations
bettors will keep the odds steady at 14–1. But since the odds were
20–1 to begin with, the net effect of the temporary bet is to lower
the odds by drawing money to the temporary-bet horse. Assuming
visibility, ignorance, asymmetry, and reaction by full rational expec-
tations bettors therefore implies that the temporary bet will draw
more money than the cancellation will displace, so the difference in
bet totals between the temporary-bet horse and the matched control
horse at post time will be positive.
If ignorance, visibility, and asymmetry conditions hold, then the
direction and strength of the effect depend on the composition of
bettors who react. If most bettors (in a dollar-weighted sense) are
opinion bettors, the temporary bet will displace money; if bettors are
full or partial rational expectations bettors, the bet will draw money.
Furthermore, the different types of bettors will react differently after
the bet lowers the odds (to 12–1 in our example). Opinion bet-
tors will bet on other horses, gradually raising the odds from 12–1
until the bet is canceled. Partial rational expectations bettors will
lower the odds after the bet. (Notice that partial rational expecta-
tions bettors can cause a self-fulfilling ‘‘mirage’’ in which a drop
from 12–1 to 10–1, say, is misinterpreted as a signal of more informa-
tion, which triggers further drops.) Full rational expectations bettors
will keep the 12–1 odds steady.
The test for an effect of temporary bets is obviously a test of the
joint hypotheses of ignorance, visibility, and asymmetry and some
specific assumption about the nature of bettors. If there is no effect,
since there are good reasons to believe that the ignorance of cancel-
lation and visibility conditions do hold, we can tentatively conclude
that either reactions are symmetric or the composition of bettors is
such that opposite effects roughly cancel each other out.
IV. Results: Sample 1
A. An Event Study Look at the Data
The initial analysis is a kind of ‘‘event study’’ popular in financial
economics (see Fama et al. 1969). In an event study, the behavior
of market movements around an event i at time Ti is aggregated
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across different events i. The method is simple: Subtract clock date
Ti from event i, so the time series of events for event i is recoded
23, 22, 21, 0, 11, 12, 13, . . . , where 0 now corresponds to ‘‘event
time’’ (formerly Ti). Then take statistical measures across events i
at equally coded event times. For example, if one wants to know the
reactions at the time of the events, compare responses at time 0. If
one wants to know whether people ‘‘anticipated’’ an event, study
the negatively numbered times 24, 23, 22, and 21 leading up to
event time 0. If one wants to know postevent reactions, study posi-
tively numbered times, and so forth.
In this study, a temporary bet is an event. Time is broken up into
discrete minutes (when the racetrack ‘‘refreshes’’ the pari-mutuel
bet totals). There are three events: The ‘‘IN’’ time, when the bet is
made; the ‘‘OUT’’ time, when the bet is canceled; and ‘‘post time’’
(POST), when any net effects of both betting and canceling are mea-
sured. The relevant data are bet totals and odds of temporary-bet
horses, and matched control horses in the same race, at IN, OUT,
and POST times. Reporting relative comparisons controls very effec-
tively for the mutual effects on both the temporary-bet and control
horses of, say, unexpectedly heavy betting on a third horse in the
same race, which would make the fractions of the totals bet on both
the temporary-bet and control horses fall.
B. Effects of Temporary Bets
Denote the dollar totals bet on the temporary-bet horse, the control
horse, and on all horses at time t by B(t), C(t), and T(t). Then
the odds on the temporary-bet horse and control horse at t are the
fractions [.85T(t)/B(t)] 2 1 and [.85T(t)/C(t)] 2 1. The top two
lines of figure 2 are the time series of the geometric mean odds of
the temporary-bet and control horses, in minutes before post time.
The bottom lines show the frequencies of the event times at which
bets (INs) and cancellations (OUTs) occurred,6 which are shown
to indicate when odds movements are expected to occur. (There is
substantial variation in the IN times because bets were made at two
different tracks, under different conditions.)
Mean odds start around 20–1 for both horses and then dip to
nearly 10–1 on the temporary-bet horses when the bets are made
(17–22 minutes to post). The picture confirms that bettors watching
the odds board for movements will see a large movement when the
temporary bet occurs. Since 20–1 odds imply that roughly 1/20 of
the win pool is bet on a horse and an average of $10,000 is bet on
6 The frequencies are actually divided by two to fit underneath the odds paths.
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Fig. 2.—Geometric mean odds on temporary-bet horses vs. control horses, sample 1
all horses when the temporary bets are made, our $500 bet roughly
doubles the amount of money bet on the temporary-bet horse, cut-
ting the odds in half.
Between minutes 216 and 27, while the temporary bet is live, the
odds creep steadily up on the temporary-bet horse. This is the first
clue that temporary bets do not draw much money toward the bet
horse. If bettors were betting in proportion to the odds they see
during minutes 216 to 27, the odds on the temporary-bet horse
would stay flat rather than creep upward. The upward creep suggests
that bettors who are betting during this time are opinion bettors
who do not believe that there is much information in odds changes.
When the bet is canceled, usually within the 26- to 24-minute mark,
the odds spike sharply upward. The odds on the temporary-bet horse
drift a bit further upward after that, but so do the odds on the con-
trol horse. Around post time, the odds on temporary-bet horses and
matched control horses are very close to equal.
Another way to see the same basic pattern is to track over time
the (arithmetic) mean of the absolute dollar differential in the total
betting pool for the temporary-bet and control horses, B(t) 2 C(t).
Figure 3 shows the mean (thick line) and the mean plus and minus
one standard error (dotted lines) of the dollar bet differential over
time. One can see that the temporary bets bump up the money on
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Fig. 3.—Betting differential over time, temporary-bet horse 2 control horse
the temporary-bet horse by almost $500 between minutes 216 and
27. The fact that the bet differential never quite reaches $500 im-
plies that after the bets are made, other bettors begin to bet slightly
less on the temporary-bet horse (compared to the control). After
the temporary bet is canceled near post time, the dollar differential
falls rapidly to zero (with an insignificant blip upward at 22). At
post time the differential is very close to zero.
The thin solid line shows the mean differential with the $500 bet
subtracted back out, to give an indication of whether the effect of the
bet was to displace money from the temporary-bet horse (creating a
negative differential) or to draw money (creating a positive differen-
tial). The mean differential is close to zero throughout, drifts slightly
negative while the temporary bet is live, and jumps back toward zero
when the bet is canceled. Bars for standard errors are omitted to
reduce clutter, but since the standard errors would have the same
spread as those around the unadjusted raw mean, a little inspection
shows that the bet-subtracted mean is significantly different from
zero only at minute 29.
C. A Further Look at Temporary Bet–Control Pairs
The event study time series is a useful way to see the effects of bets
and cancellations, but it is not statistically powerful because it does
not exploit the fact that each temporary-bet horse is paired with a
control. A better look at the data takes each temporary bet and
control pair as an observation. Each observation is a pair of num-
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Fig. 4.—Betting changes between POST and IN 2 2, temporary bet/control pairs
bers: The first number is the net change in the percentage bet
on the temporary-bet horse, measured from 2 minutes before the
bet took place, 2 minutes before IN, to post time (denoted
[B(POST)/T(POST)] 2 [B(IN 2 2)/T(IN 2 2)]). The second
number is the analogous net change for the paired control horse,
[C(POST)/T(POST)] 2 [C(IN 2 2)/T(IN 2 2)].
Keep in mind that the temporary bet is not reflected in the broad-
casted totals at time IN 2 2, and the bet has been taken out before
post time. Thus the change in net percentage bet between IN 2 2
and post time reflects only the effects the temporary bet has on other
bettors, while the bet was live and between the time it was canceled
and post time.
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the betting change percentages
for the 50 temporary bet–control pairs. Points below the identity
line, to the right, indicate a more positive net effect on the tempo-
rary-bet horse than on the paired control horse; they represent cases
in which money is drawn to the temporary-bet horse by the bet (rela-
tive to the control). Points above the identity line, to the left, indicate
that the temporary bet displaced or pushed money away.
There are about equally many points above and below the identity
line (28 of 50 are above). The means (medians) for the temporary-
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bet and control horse changes are 2.01224 (2.00904) and 2.01434
(2.0126), only about half a standard error from zero. The difference
in the two percentages has a mean of .00211 and is insignificant
(t(48) 5 .74). Nonparametric tests do not detect a significant differ-
ence either. Figure 4 shows a distinct outlier in the upper left, when
the temporary-bet horse fell by .08 and the control by only .01, mak-
ing a difference in bet change percentages four standard deviations
from the sample mean. Excluding this outlier raises the mean differ-
ence between the temporary-bet and control changes to .00360,
which is marginally significant (t(48) 5 1.46, p 5 .15, two-tailed),
but there is no special reason to exclude only this outlier.
It is possible that half the temporary bets push money away and
half draw money. If that were so, the mean change in temporary-
bet horse betting would be no different from the change in control
horse betting, but the variance of the betting changes for the tempo-
rary-bet horse would be large compared to the variation for the con-
trol horse. Looking at figure 4 suggests that this is so—there is more
dispersion in betting changes for the temporary-bet horse—but
keep in mind that some of the control horses are actually two- and
three-horse composites. These composites are averages, so they will
naturally have less variance than the single-horse temporary-bet
changes. When the standard deviation is adjusted upward appropri-
ately, the sample standard deviation for shifts in bets on the control
horse is .01466, which is insignificantly smaller than the standard
deviation for the temporary-bet horse, .01804 by an F-test. Thus it
appears that the temporary bets do not change the mean amount
bet, nor the variance in bet changes, on the temporary-bet horses
compared to matched controls.
D. Within-Bet and Postcancellation Betting Shifts
While there is no detectable net effect of the temporary bets on bet-
ting, it is possible that there is one effect while the bet is ongoing
(between the IN and OUT points) and an opposite effect when the
bet is canceled, at time OUT.
To check for this, figure 5 shows a scatter plot of temporary-bet
and control-bet shifts while the bet is live, between time OUT 2 1
(i.e., 1 minute before the bet is canceled) and IN 1 1 (1 minute
after it was made). The plotted points are the pairs {[B(OUT 2
1)/T(OUT 2 1)] 2 [B(IN 1 1)/T(IN 1 1)], [C(OUT 2
1)/T(OUT 2 1)] 2 [C(IN 1 1)/T(IN 1 1)]}. The large majority
of points lie above the upper left of the identity line. This means
that after the temporary bet, the win pool percentage of the tempo-
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Fig. 5.—Within-temporary-bet shifts, (OUT 2 1) 2 (IN 1 1)
rary-bet horse fell more than that of the control horse (recall that
figs. 2–3 also showed this effect). Since the win pool is cumulating
during this time, this means that the $500 bet is not matched by
similar infusions of money, so it is shrinking as a percentage of the
amount bet on the temporary-bet horse. This means that most bet-
tors who are betting in this time period are some mixture of opinion
and full rational expectations bettors.
A similar look at the movement in bet pool percentages between
OUT 1 1 and post time (reported in my working paper [Camerer
1996]) shows no significant difference in changes between the tem-
porary-bet and control horses. Putting the four slices of time to-
gether forms a composite picture: When the bet is made, it causes
a large bump in the percentage of the total pool bet on the tempo-
rary-bet horse (about .04); between the time the bet is made (IN 1
1) and the time it is canceled (OUT 2 1), the percentage of the
pool on the temporary-bet horse shrinks a bit (by about .03) because
fans do not continue to bet with the combined proportion of the
prebet and $500 total. When the $500 bet is withdrawn, the percent-
age falls but by only .01 because the entire bet pool is much larger;
after the bet is canceled, no relative movement occurs. Putting these
pieces together and recalling the thin flat line from figure 3, we can
see why the temporary bets have no net effect.
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E. Cross-Bet Comparisons
It may be that temporary bets have no effect on average but do have
effects that are predictably related to observables. To check for pre-
dictability, I regressed the net temporary-bet effect (the difference
in POST minus IN 2 1 bet shifts between temporary-bet and control
horses) against several variables: track location; ‘‘manipulability’’ of
the race, measured by the total dollars bet on the attack horse at
time IN; and duration of the attack in minutes. A weak positive effect
of duration was found (t 5 1.39 when less significant variables were
excluded). This positive effect is a little surprising because it means
that placing the bet earlier (when its effect on odds is more dramatic,
but it might be more likely to be discounted as uninformative) and
withdrawing it later seems to help draw money. It may be that cancel-
ing very late is important for manipulating the markets. Further ex-
periments could try to exploit this shred of predictability.
V. Results: Sample 2
The initial sample shows no substantial net effect of the temporary
bets. Given this finding, it seemed sensible to try harder by making
bets with more impact. The two dimensions of impact are size and
timing: Bets can be larger (as a percentage of the win pool) and
made and canceled closer to post time. Bets of this sort are more
likely to either appear informative and draw money, or move odds
more dramatically and scare away money from opinion bettors (who
have less time to adjust and pour money back on the temporary-bet
horse after the bets are canceled, if the cancellation is close to post
time). To vary impact on these dimensions, 33 more temporary bets
were made at smaller racetracks with about a third of the total bet-
ting volume of the tracks studied in the first study. Several small
changes were made in the design. In the light of the results of the
first study, the changes were made with an eye toward giving manipu-
lation its best chance to work.
A total of $1,000 was bet. At the time the bet was made, the median
total win pool was $14,003, so the bets are 7 percent of the win pool.
In six cases the bets are more than 20 percent (the maximum is 40
percent).
The bets were made in two separate $500 bets. Betting in two waves
had some logistical advantages and might fool people into thinking
that more than one insider was betting the horse.
Because this second sample is taken from smaller tracks with less
betting handle and during an off-peak part of the year when crowds
are smaller, it was possible to delay betting until approximately 13
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Fig. 6.—Geometric mean odds on temporary-bet vs. control horses, large-bet
sample 2.
and 9 minutes before post time. Many bettors think, probably cor-
rectly, that better-informed bettors bet later (in order to know more
about what odds they will get and to hide their information from
the public as long as possible). Hence, by betting later, I might be
able to fool more rational expectations bettors into thinking that
my bets revealed information.
Because betting lines were short, the bets could be reliably can-
celed just before post time, at 23 and 21 on average. This too may
enhance manipulation by making the effect on the odds of canceling
the bet smaller and giving bettors who were earlier drawn toward or
away from the temporary-bet horse little time to change their minds.
The results of the 33 bets in this large-bet replication are shown
in figure 6. The figure plots the geometric mean odds on temporary-
bet (thick solid line) and control horses (dotted line) in the 20 min-
utes before post time. As in the companion figure 2, the lines at the
bottom show the frequency of times at which IN bets (solid line)
and OUT cancellations (dotted line) took place. (The IN and
OUT frequencies each have two spikes because two $500 bets were
made in each race.) The initial temporary bet, at around 213, drops
the odds from 15–1 to 10–1, and the second temporary bet drops
the odds further to around 7–1. There is a small upward drift in the
odds on the temporary-bet horse in the gully between the INs and
the OUTs, from 27 to 24, which means that bettors are not drawn
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sufficiently by the temporary bet to keep the odds low (as we saw in
sample 1, in fig. 2). After all the OUTs are made, around post time,
the odds jump up a bit more; the odds on the control horse rise
too. The final odds are slightly lower on temporary-bet horses, about
18–1 versus 22–1.
Further analysis replicates the basic results from the first sample.
The mean change between POST 1 2 and IN 2 2 in the percentage
bet on the temporary-bet horse is 2.00587 (2.01224 in sample 1),
with a standard deviation of .02056. The corresponding figures for
control horses are 2.01261 (2.01434 in sample 1) and .0285 (ad-
justed for composite controls). The mean temporary bet–control
bet shift is .006734, with a standard deviation of .03128 (t(32) 5
1.23, p 5 .24). The median is .0078, and 22 of 33 observations are
positive.7
Pooling these results with the sample 1 results provides weak evi-
dence of a significant positive effect of the temporary bets. The
pooled mean for the temporary bet–control difference is .003946,
with a standard deviation of .02508 and a t-statistic testing for zero
mean of t(82) 5 1.43 (p 5 .16). A conservative sign test—50 of 83
differences are positive—gives z 5 1.91 (p 5 .06). If there is an effect
from these types of temporary bets, it is probably positive, but the
magnitude is small enough to still allow the conclusion that manipu-
lating these markets is, if not impossible, certainly not easy.
Two minor effects in the replication sample are notable.
‘‘Maiden’’ races are races for horses that have never won before (and
often are racing for the first time). Less is known about these horses,
so bettors may watch odds movements more closely for clues about
information, and manipulations may be easier. In the replication
sample 2 there were 18 maiden races and 15 races for winners. This
unusually high percentage of maiden races permits a powerful test
for a maiden-race effect. In maiden races, the net temporary-bet ef-
fect between IN 2 2 and POST, relative to the control, is slightly
positive (.01294) and weakly significantly larger than in nonmaiden
races (2.01223; t(31) 5 1.22, p 5 .12, one-tailed). The effect goes in
the sensible direction: Since there is little public information about
horses in maiden races, bettors might be more likely to infer infor-
mation from price movements and bet on horses whose odds drop.
7 An earlier version of this paper (Camerer 1996) reported the first 19 large bets
in sample 2; the additional 14 were made to see whether the maiden-nonmaiden
difference is robust. Those 19 bets gave temporary-bet minus control percentage
changes of 2.0045 (mean) and .007 (median). The mean has the opposite sign but
is not significantly different from the results in the additional 14 observations. If
the difference is genuine, it might be due to betting at much smaller tracks for the
additional 14 bets. (For those bets the median total win pool at time 29 was $6,492.)
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Temporary bets do draw money toward the temporary-bet horse in
these races. However, the effect in the original sample is stronger
and in the opposite direction: Maiden races have a bet control differ-
ence of 2.00478 whereas nonmaiden winners have a difference of
.008081 (t(41) 5 22.318, p 5 .03). Pooling the two samples wipes
out both effects.
A more interesting effect arises from the size of the bet pool.
While the regression analysis from sample 1 showed no effect of the
size of the betting pool, within sample 2 the correlation coefficient
of the difference in percentage changes with pool size of bet and
control horses (measured by 29 total win bets) is 2.345 (t(32) 5
1.98, p 5 .05). However, a t-test using a median split on pool size,
and comparing the bet control differences across below-median and
above-median pools, gives means of .0119 (above-median) and .0029
(below-median), with t(30) 5 .80.
These weak effects hold out some slim hope that making tempo-
rary bets on maiden races, with small bet pools, could reliably draw
money toward the temporary-bet horses. However, one should keep
in mind that the sample 2 bets are already quite large. Any racetrack
observer would be startled to see the odds on a horse fall by half in
one blink of the tote board. The fact that manipulations this large
do not generate reliable effects casts doubt on the possibility that
even larger bets have effects.
VI. Conclusion
The answer to my title question is ‘‘no.’’ Pari-mutuel racetrack odds
could not be systematically manipulated with a sample of 50 $500
and 33 $1,000 bets on randomly chosen temporary-bet horses, com-
pared with matched-pair control horses in the same race. There is
no evidence during any period—while the bet was ‘‘live’’ and low-
ered the odds on the bet horse, after it was canceled (raising the
odds), or over the entire prebet to postbet period—that other bet-
tors responded systematically to the temporary bets. The bets also
did not increase the variance of pre- and postbet changes on the
temporary-bet horse, relative to the controls, so it is not the case that
temporary bets worked strongly in opposite directions.
One possibility is that these bets were too small, or the markets
too large, for the effect of bets to be visible. Larger bets might have
different effects. More experiments could conceivably test that possi-
bility, but the $1,000 small-pool bets are already quite large. Those
bets were 7 percent of the win pool, on average (and frequently up
to 20 percent).
Another possibility is that bettors react oppositely to the bet and
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its cancellation and the two effects roughly cancel (violating the
asymmetry condition assumed in the theory). This seems unlikely
because separate analyses of the within-bet effects (fig. 5) and after-
cancellation effects do not show much effect in either period of
time. In addition, in the sample 2 replication the time of the bet
and its cancellation were delayed substantially, bringing them 2–5
minutes closer to post time. Pushing the betting and cancellation
later means that bettors have much less time to react to the cancella-
tion, which should make effects even more asymmetric, but there is
little difference between overall effects in samples 1 and 2.
Still another possibility is that markets can be manipulated under
some identifiable conditions. There are very weak effects of duration
and total bet pool on temporary-bet shifts and weak positive effects
in races on nonwinner ‘‘maiden’’ horses (when bettors might be
trying to infer information from odds movements more closely) in
one sample, but stronger negative effects in another sample. These
features may provide clues about how further studies could be de-
signed with a better chance of manipulating markets. In my opinion,
it is likely that the duration and maiden-race effects are statistical
artifacts that will not replicate, but the ability to draw money through
temporary bets in very small win pools may be replicable.
The fact that money is slightly displaced while the temporary bet
is live (causing the temporary-bet horse’s share of the win pool to
fall) but there is no net effect suggests that bettors are some roughly
equal (dollar-weighted) combination of opinion and rational expec-
tations bettors. There must be some opinion bettors because if there
were only partial and full rational expectations bettors the odds
would be steady or would fall after the bet is made, but the odds
drift upward instead. And there must be some rational expectations
bettors to offset the effect of the opinion bettors, because otherwise
total betting on the temporary-bet horse would fall (compared with
the control) while the bet is live, which it does not.
Ironically, the slightly stronger positive effect in small bet pools
(within sample 2) suggests that there might be relatively more ratio-
nal expectations bettors at these small ‘‘bullring’’ tracks; in a sense,
these bettors are more sophisticated because they take price move-
ments to be informative and react to them a bit more strongly.
Perhaps the most basic conclusion is that these markets simply
aggregate information remarkably well, and accordingly, bettors
know enough to ignore a large bet that is made far before post time
and is not backed up by a steady flow of money, which keeps the
heavily bet horse’s odds down. How information can aggregate if
traders react to signals in opposite ways is a bit of a mystery, but
pari-mutuel betting markets are generally considered ‘‘surprisingly
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efficient’’ (Thaler and Ziemba 1988) (although, as in financial mar-
kets, painstaking analyses of lots of data have turned up some inter-
esting anomalies that can sometimes be profitably exploited; see,
e.g., Hausch and Ziemba [1995]).
To return to the original motivation for this experiment, the in-
ability of these large bets to move the market systematically is a blow
to the beliefs of those who think that markets are easily and rou-
tinely manipulated by large investors. For those who do not believe
that manipulation is common and instead are inclined to marvel
at the mysterious collective intelligence of centralized markets popu-
lated by self-interested traders, the immunity of these markets to sub-
stantial, systematic attempts at manipulation may represent some-
thing new to explain, or at least marvel at.
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